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Book Review
The Lessons of Narrative:
A Review of How Lawyers Lose Their
Way: A Profession Fails its Creative
Minds by Jean Stefancic and Richard
Delgado
Arthur M. Wolfson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Narrative has many uses in legal scholarship. It has been
used to show how the perspective of women and minorities is
systemically excluded from the law and legal commentary.' It has
been used to shed light on the voices behind complicated Supreme
* Law clerk, The Honorable Richard A. Morgan, Office of
Administrative Law Judges, United States Department of Labor. J.D.,
University of Pittsburgh School of Law (2005); B.A., College of William &
Mary (1999). I would like to thank Matthew Mannix and the Editorial Staff
of the Roger Williams University Law Review for their assistance in bringing
this project to completion.
1. See, e.g., Ana Garza, Note, The Voice of Color and Its Value in Legal
Storytelling, 1 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POLx' 105 (1994).
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Court cases.2 In their new book published by Duke University
Press, How Lawyers Lose Their Way: A Profession Fails its
Creative Minds, Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado put narrative
theory to another use: to demonstrate and explain the pervasive
unhappiness in the lives of many lawyers. 3
As many as twenty percent of lawyers are reported to be
"extremely dissatisfied with their jobs."4 Forty thousand leave the
profession each year.5 A recent study found that only half of its
respondents would become lawyers, if they had it to do over
again.6 One career counselor who works with young lawyers
reported that "[a]t any given time, at least a third of the people
I'm dealing with would walk out of the law tomorrow if they
could." 7 The rampant dissatisfaction among members of the legal
profession is well documented.8 Thus, the concern Stefancic and
Delgado present is not novel.
Yet it is not Stefancic and Delgado's call for happier lawyers
that makes this book unique; rather, it is the technique they use
that makes it most meaningful. Stefancic and Delgado have
pioneered the use of narrative in legal scholarship. 9 In doing so,
2. See, e.g., Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381
(1989).
3. JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, How LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY:
A PROFESSION FAILS ITS CREATIVE MINDS (2005) [hereinafter STEFANCIC &
DELGADO, How LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY].
4. James M. Cooper, Towards a New Architecture: Creative Problem
Solving and the Evolution of Law, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 297, 303 (1998).
5. Diana Nelson Jones, Legally Unhappy: Experts Worry About Growing
Tide of Lawyers Abandoning Careers, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 4,
2005 at E-1.
6. Thomas D. Morgan, Creating a Life as a Lawyer, 38 VAL. U. L. REV.
37, 38 (2003).
7. Jones, supra note 5.
8. See STEFANCIC & DELGADO, How LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY, supra
note 3 (citing WALTER BENNET, THE LAWYER'S MYTH: REVIVING IDEAL FOR THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (2001); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:
REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000); MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION
UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING
IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993)).
9. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) [hereinafter
Delgado, Plea for Narrative]; Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School:
A Reply to Farber & Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993) [hereinafter
Delgado, Reply]; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Final Chronicle: Cultural Power,
the Law Reviews, and the Attack on Narrative Jurisprudence, 68 S. CAL. L.
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they have crafted a paradigm by which they challenge prevailing
notions on complex social issues and offer the possibility of future
change.10 While How Lawyers Lose Their Way is not written in
narrative form, it employs the narrative paradigm in discussing
works that are and, accordingly, offers similar lessons about the
condition it considers.
When viewing How Lawyers Lose Their Way through the lens
of the narrative paradigm, the book is divided into two distinct
parts. First, Stefancic and Delgado use the Introduction and first
three chapters to present their primary thesis: that the root of
what plagues the legal profession is a pervasive mode of thought
they call formalism. They present this argument by relying on the
narrative paradigm and discuss specific lessons it produces.
Second, in Chapters four through seven, the authors apply these
lessons to explain the hardships that exist in the lives of many
lawyers. The authors conclude this second part with their own
observations, as well as suggestions aimed at moving toward a
happier legal profession.
This Book Review focuses on Stefancic and Delgado's use of
the narrative paradigm, the lessons they derive from it, and the
application of those lessons to the lives of lawyers. Part II
outlines the narrative paradigm and demonstrates how Stefancic
and Delgado apply it in How Lawyers Lose Their Way.
Specifically, Part II describes how the authors use the
majoritarian tale and the counterstory, with formalism accounting
for the former and the story of a famous soul-searching lawyer
constituting the latter. Part II also details the specific lessons
derived from the authors' use of the narrative paradigm. Part III
recounts how Stefancic and Delgado relate these lessons to the
modern day tribulations of many lawyers. Part IV then considers
whether Stefancic and Delgado's position is overly conceptual,
thus discounting a proper consideration of the economic realities
REV. 545 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo's Final Chronicle]; Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious
Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1929 (1991), Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Imposition, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025 (1994).
10. I will hereinafter refer to this structural use of narrative as the
"narrative paradigm." As discussed fully in Part II, infra, the narrative
paradigm consists of two distinct stories - the majoritarian tale and
counterstory - which compete for attention in a given context.
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of legal practice. Part IV ends by illustrating how the lessons
derived from the authors' use of the narrative paradigm
ultimately prove relevant for these concerns as well. This Review
concludes that the lessons derived from the narrative paradigm
provide hope for a happier and more fulfilling practice of law.
II. THE NARRATIVE PARADIGM:
FORMALISM AND THE POUND-MACLEISH RELATIONSHIP
Stefancic and Delgado have long been leaders in advocating
the use of narrative in law and legal scholarship.11 Their use of
narrative exists as a paradigm of two competing stories: the
majoritarian tale and the counterstory. 12 In a given context, each
exists as a story told by a group with a clearly defined set of
experiences and interests. 13 Upon repeated telling, the story itself
becomes a constructed reality for the storyteller. 14 The competing
story, accordingly, exists as a constructed reality for its storyteller.
When one story is socially adopted over another, the reality it
purports gains acceptance by society at large.
The majoritarian tale is the story told, in any given context,
by the dominant group.' 5 Because of its dominant position, that
group often views its tale as unqualified truth.1 6 Accordingly,
these tales often acquire the status of societal norms, conventions,
and understandings that, over time, seem natural. 7 Indeed,
because they originate in the majoritarian tale, these norms are
often left unquestioned.18 However, one of the most essential
tenets of the narrative paradigm is that the majoritarian tale is
not truth, but indeed just another competing story.
11. See supra note 9 (citing examples of Delgado's and Stefancic's
narrative works).
12. Delgado, Plea for Narrative, supra note 9, at 2418.
13. Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 263-64
(1994) ("[Sltorytelling relies and builds on background assumptions that are
the products of a (mostly) shared culture.... Assumptions and expectations,
whether experiential or ideological in origin, are necessary to organize the
information we receive; they structure thought. Background assumptions
determine, in great measure, whether a particular account will be heard as a
story at all . . ").
14. Delgado, Plea for Narrative, supra note 9, at 2416-17.
15. Id. at 2412.
16. Delgado, Rodrigo's Final Chronicle, supra note 9, at 553.
17. Delgado, Reply, supra note 9, at 666.
18. Delgado, Rodrigo's Final Chronicle, supra note 9, at 553.
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The second part of the narrative paradigm is the counterstory.
The counterstory is a different account of the same set of facts the
majoritarian tale uses. However, it often highlights different
facts, or sequences of facts, and is told with a different tone than
the majoritarian tale. 19 These stories are indeed "counter" as they
are told with the purpose of challenging the assumed truth of the
majoritarian tale. 20 To that end, the counterstory seeks to jar the
foundation on which the majoritarian tale rests.21 In doing so, the
counterstory serves two purposes: it (1) unmasks the majoritarian
tale as merely a story, and not unqualified truth; and (2) shows
that if the common assumptions of a given context are susceptible
to question, change within that context is possible.22
In legal scholarship, the context in which the narrative
paradigm appears most is race. 23 In that setting, the majoritarian
tale generally consists of the stories of white people. 24 When these
stories circulate unchallenged, the point of reference for discussing
race in legal scholarship is affixed at the white perspective. 25 The
white perspective, accordingly, becomes the presumed truth.26
The counterstory, then, does not so much seek to tell stories from
a perspective of people of color, but rather serves to jar the
presumed truth of the white perspective. 27 In doing so, the
counterstory shows that relying solely on the white majoritarian
19. Delgado, Plea for Narrative, supra note 9, at 2425.
20. Delgado, Reply, supra note 9, at 671; Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Hateful Speech, Loving Communities: Why Our Notion of "A Just
Balance" Changes So Slowly, 82 CAL. L. REV. 851, 867 (1994) [hereinafter
Delgado & Stefancic, Hateful Speech].
21. Delgado, Reply, supra note 9, at 671; Delgado & Stefancic, Hateful
Speech, supra note 20, at 867.
22. Baron, supra note 13, at 269; Delgado, Plea for Narrative, supra note
9, at 2314-15.
23. Delgado, Reply, supra note 9, at 670 ("[Mlany [Critical Race Theory]
writers employ the 'counterstory' ... ."); Nancy L. Cook, Outside the
Tradition: Literature as Legal Scholarship, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 102 (1994).
24. Cook, supra note 23, at 105.
25. Id. at 106.
26. In their various articles, Delgado and Stefancic describe several
examples of such presumed truths based on the white perspective. See, e.g.,
Delgado & Stefancic, Hateful Speech, supra note 20, at 867 (describing the
prevailing notion of the innocent white male and the idea that racial
discrimination does not exist without intent); Delgado, Rodrigo's Final
Chronicle, supra note 9, at 552 (describing the idea that the free market will
drive out discrimination).
27. Delgado, Reply, supra note 9, at 670-71.
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tale leaves us with an incomplete understanding of race and the
law. By challenging the assumption that the white perspective is
truth, we are more able to construct our discourse on race upon
fairer and richer premises. 28
Race, however, is not the exclusive setting in which the
narrative paradigm may operate. 29  Indeed, the paradigm is
relevant to the examination of any situation in which a defined
majoritarian tale has evolved into presumed truth. The
counterstory may then be used to impeach the notion that the
majoritarian "way" is the only "way." In doing so, the
counterstory does a great service - it shows that something
different - and likely better - is possible. 30
In How Lawyers Lose Their Way, Stefancic and Delgado
expand the use of the narrative paradigm beyond the familiar
context of race to shed light on the lives of lawyers. They define
the majoritarian tale as a life characterized by formalism.
Formalism is a pattern of thought that emphasizes rigid rules and
systems at the expense of creativity. In contrast, the counterstory
- and indeed the centerpiece of the book - is the relationship forged
between Ezra Pound and Archibald MacLeish. That relationship
reveals the life of a lawyer who seeks, and eventually finds,
personal fulfillment in his work despite the obstacles of
professional rigidity he encounters along the way. In presenting
both the majoritarian tale and the counterstory in this fashion,
Stefancic and Delgado fulfill the two purposes of the narrative
paradigm: they show that the accepted condition of formalism is
not inevitable and, concurrently, they offer hope that change
toward a happier and more fulfilled legal profession is indeed
possible.
Though they never describe it in such terms, Stefancic and
Delgado's account of formalism represents the majoritarian tale in
describing the lives of lawyers.31 Indeed, much like a story told
28. Id. at 671; Delgado, Plea for Narrative, supra note 9, at 2415.
29. See Delgado & Stefancic, Imposition, supra note 9, at 1029 ("Th[e]
'counterstorytelling' approach examines majoritarian stories in order to
understand their structure and function, especially in relation to social
justice.").
30. Baron, supra note 13, at 269.
31. Stefancic and Delgado do, however write that their depiction of
formalism is akin to "a story or narrative." See STEFANCIC & DELGADO, How
LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY, supra note 3, at 33.
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from the perspective of a dominant group, Stefancic and Delgado
show how formalism characterizes both the thinking and lifestyle
of many lawyers. The condition has become so pervasive that, like
any majoritarian tale, formalism has become accepted as
inevitable in a life in law.
Detailing the concept in both the Introduction and Chapter
three, Stefancic and Delgado define the concept of formalism as "a
habit of a mind and a type of social organization that attempts
perversely to narrow one's focus beyond that which a situation
requires to render justice to it."32 Stefancic and Delgado present
several examples of how formalism exists as a pattern of thought
and defines the lives of many lawyers. It begins in law school,
where the curriculum focuses on doctrines and cases at the
expense of interdisciplinary study.3 3 This translates into a mode
of reasoning driven by inward-looking rules and precedent rather
than social policy and external effect.3 4 This, in turn, has led to a
practice of law characterized as "disciplined, routinized,
compartmentalized, and result-driven."35 It has also led to court
decisions focused on rules and principles but devoid of an interest
in the lives they affect. 36
These elements of formalism combine to offer lawyers
professional lives of systemic rigidity. Lawyers often lack the
flexibility to use their skills expansively, creatively, or for pursuits
with personal meaning. This rigidity exists systemically as the
profession's internally created rules and standards exist to
perpetuate its existence. This condition exists as a majoritarian
tale.37 Aspiring lawyers follow a familiar track: they learn to
manipulate cases and doctrines in law school in an attempt to
prove worthy of entrance into a law firm.38 Then, they traverse its
32. Id. at xi. Stefancic and Delgado reformulate this definition elsewhere
in the book. For example, they later describe it as the "regimentation of
thought and reasoning" whose adherents are "satisfied with, [and do] not
even question, narrowly defined views of life and knowledge." Id.
33. Id. at 35.
34. Id. at 34-35.
35. Id. at 39.
36. Id. at 40. Delgado and Stefancic also catalog how formalism has
played a role in many major twentieth century cases. See id. at 40-44.
37. See id. at 44 ("[Fjormalism remains the dominant self-understanding
of law schools and the practicing bar.").
38. Id. at 39.
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hierarchical structure in pursuit of a lucrative partnership. 39
Consistent with the majoritarian tale, the track towards law firm
success appears as the presumed norm for a life in law, and
attempts to forge a different path are often deemed abnormal and
lesser.40
Sandwiched in between the two accounts of formalism is the
counterstory. Stefancic and Delgado present this part of the
paradigm by recounting the relationship of Ezra Pound and
Archibald MacLeish. Their examination reveals the story of
MacLeish's rejection of formalism and often turbulent quest for
creativity in his life as a lawyer. In doing so, Stefancic and
Delgado show that formalism need not inevitably define a lawyer's
life and, concurrently, offer insights for those seeking more
fulfillment from a life in law.
Brief biographies of Pound and MacLeish reveal men who led
very different lives, yet similarly strove to find meaning and
purpose. From his youngest days, Pound's life centered around
his quest to find and express his literary voice. Born and educated
in the United States, Pound emigrated to Europe in 1908, shortly
after he graduated from college. 41 He became a fixture in the
literary circles of London and later Paris, and was known for his
outlandish attire and leadership in the literary community. 42 His
poetry was widely acclaimed and he became known as the
"acknowledged architect of modern poetry."43 His work marked
the transition from ornate and traditional Victorian poetry to
verse characterized by "sharp images [][and] precise words."44
Against the backdrop of post-World War I Europe, Pound moved
to Italy and became an ardent follower of Mussolini. 45 After the
stock market crash of 1929, Pound voiced strong criticism of the
United States in written publications and on radio broadcasts. 46
39. Id. at 46.
40. See Jones, supra note 5 (quoting a law school dean who states that
the legal profession "has certain standards and approaches" and a "mentality
that you're a loser if you don't go to a big firm").
41. STEFANCIC & DELGADO, How LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY, supra note 3,
at 6.
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 8-9.
46. Id. at 9-11.
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When Mussolini's government fell, Pound was arrested and
returned to the United States to stand trial for treason.47 A jury
found him to be of unsound mind and he was committed
indefinitely to the St. Elizabeth's Hospital for the Criminally
Insane.48 Even during his confinement, however, Pound continued
to publish literature that received wide acclaim.
49
MacLeish also found meaning in literary expression.
Whereas Pound's writing constituted his life's work, however,
MacLeish turned intermittently to literature in reaction to the
lack of fulfillment he found both in law and his blue-blooded
world. 50 MacLeish's early adulthood followed a track that all but
guaranteed professional achievement, monetary success, and
social standing. He moved effortlessly from Hotchkiss to Yale to
Harvard Law School to a position at a prominent Boston law
firm.5 1 Yet from the outset, it was a path he traversed with
trepidation. Indeed, as early as his Yale years, MacLeish had
designs on becoming a writer; Stefancic and Delgado note that his
decision to pursue a career in law was a "compromise."52 Despite
his success as a lawyer, MacLeish found the work to be of little
social consequence and the rewards superficial. 53  He
contemplated leaving the law over several years, and eventually
did so to pursue the writing career that continued to beckon. 54 He
emigrated to France and joined the literary community of which
Pound was then a member.55 However, he found little lasting
success as a writer; the literary community never fully accepted
MacLeish into its midst, seemingly doubting his authenticity. 56
He returned to the United States, finding work first with a
national magazine and then the federal government.57
MacLeish and Pound had known of each other since
MacLeish's years in France. Indeed, MacLeish greatly admired
47. Id. at 11.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 13-15.
51. Id. at 12-14.
52. Id. at 13.
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 16.
57. Id. at 17-21.
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Pound's writing and, though he actively sought Pound's approval,
the admiration was not reciprocated.58 Years later, their paths
crossed in a more lasting manner. In 1949, while he was
committed at St. Elizabeth's, Pound received the prestigious
Bollingen Prize for poetry from the Fellows of American Letters of
the Library of Congress for his Pisan Cantos.59 Because the work
was rife with Pound's anti-American and pro-fascist beliefs, the
award was wildly controversial.60 MacLeish, who at this point
was teaching rhetoric at Harvard, published a spirited defense of
the award. Though he personally disagreed with Pound's views,
he defended the value of the work to promote free artistic
expression in a democratic society. 61 MacLeish's defense of Pound
drew the ire of political and academic leaders; yet as Stefancic and
Delgado posit, it "proved a turning point in [his] life."62
Much later, MacLeish provided an even more valuable service
to Pound when he took up the cause of securing his release. Over
several years, MacLeish gathered the support of literary figures
and government officials. 63 Eventually, Pound received a new
hearing and, after ten years of incarceration, was released.64
It is against this backdrop that Stefancic and Delgado offer
the linchpin of the book - their analysis of MacLeish's motivation
for coming to Pound's aid. Stefancic and Delgado consider both
MacLeish's sympathy for a fallen hero and his sense of public
duty; however, at the heart of their analysis is what the writers
call MacLeish's own "vicarious satisfaction."6 5 Indeed, MacLeish's
efforts on behalf of Pound represented the climax in his ongoing
quest for personal and professional fulfillment in the law.66
MacLeish often questioned the social usefulness of legal
practice; he found most cases to be about little more than
58. Id. at 17.
59. Id. at 23.
60. Id. at 10-11.
61. Id. at 24.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 25.
64. Id. at 26.
65. Id. at 27.
66. Id. Stefancic and Delgado write that, "In rescuing Pound, MacLeish
rescued himself, attaining psychological and personal integration and a sense
of closure." Id.
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"whether $900,000 belonged this way or that."67 He also found the
personal rewards of the aforementioned career track to be
unsatisfying, commenting that he was "'attracted to the law by
considerations the most superficial imaginable.' 68 Now, however,
he was able to base his legal work on passion and experience.
Indeed, it was because of his affinity for Pound's poetry and the
artistic freedom it represented that MacLeish labored successfully
on his behalf.69 It was through these efforts that, as Stefancic and
Delgado note, MacLeish satisfied "his longings for richness and
texture" in law. 70
Here, Stefancic and Delgado present the counterstory.
MacLeish's rejection of his patterned career track was also a
rejection of formalism. He discarded the dominant mode of
thought and affirmatively sought something else. Though he
found more failure than success in the quest, his eventual work on
behalf of Pound marked the climax in his search for meaning as a
lawyer.
Stefancic and Delgado's use of the narrative paradigm offers
three important lessons regarding the lives of lawyers. First, it
reveals the pervasiveness of formalism in the legal profession. As
with any majoritarian tale, it operates as the presumed truth in
its given context. In the context of the legal profession, formalism
traps many unhappy lawyers in mundane and unfulfilling
professional lives.
The second lesson, which is somewhat paradoxical, is that of
the counterstory. MacLeish's ultimate attainment of meaningful
legal work shows that while formalism pervades, it need not
control. Because the constraints of formalism are systemic, the
task of displacing it is indeed challenging; it is possible, however,
for the individual lawyer, like MacLeish, to find a sense of
purpose. In a most poignant line, Stefancic and Delgado sum up
this lesson by writing, "if you allow yourself to think of what you
do in crabbed terms, you are apt to find yourself working in a
crabbed workplace as well."71  Thus, despite seemingly
67. Id. at 15.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 27.
70. Id. at 29.
71. Id. at 77. See also Steven Keeva, Keeva on Life and Practice, 91
A.B.A. J. 80, 80 (2005) (noting in a review of How Lawyers Lose Their Way
2006]
442 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 11:431
overwhelming forces, it is up to the individual in the end to accept
formalism or reject it and forge a meaningful life in law. 72
The third lesson, consistent with any successful presentation
of the narrative paradigm is that if the majoritarian tale need not
dominate, then change is indeed possible. In this context, because
Stefancic and Delgado have shown that a lawyer's life of
formalism is not inevitable, there is indeed hope that members of
the profession may find happier lives in the future.
III. APPLICATION TO THE LivEs OF LAWYERS
Stefancic and Delgado apply the lessons from the narrative
paradigm to the lives of lawyers in Chapters four through seven.
They do so in two interconnected parts. First, they describe, in
some detail, the lifestyle that many lawyers lead. This life is all
too often unfulfilled professionally and unhappy personally.
Second, interspersed in this description, is the application of the
narrative lessons. Stefancic and Delgado explain how formalism
is at the root of many of these problems and, accordingly, how the
counterstory of MacLeish proves to be most applicable.
Stefancic and Delgado offer a wealth of information regarding
the unsatisfying life of many lawyers by offering insights into
three of its elements: (1) legal education; (2) professional life; and,
(3) personal life. The common thread that runs through each is a
dominating formalistic pattern of thought.
A lawyer's discontent, the authors assert in Chapter five,
begins in law school. Even the casual observer can easily notice
the tense environment that exists at many of the nation's law
schools. The classes are large, the students are competitive, and
student-faculty interaction is at a minimum.73 But Stefancic and
Delgado focus less on the outwardly apparent elements of law
school and more on those developed internally within students.
Students are taught from the outset that law is a system of tightly
crafted rules and standards. Thus the focus of the law student is
to arrive at "an objective 'right answer."'74 Law students become
that this particular line, "stopped [him] cold").
72. See Keeva, supra note 71, at 80 (commenting that the power to find a
personal sense of meaning as a lawyer "lies with the individual").
73. STEFANcic & DELGADO, How LAwYERs LOSE THEIR WAY, supra note 3,
at 62.
74. Id. at 63.
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overly cautious in their thinking and creativity, accordingly, is
discouraged. 75 Moreover, law students learn that correctness
comes only through this rigid process. Thus, Stefancic and
Delgado show how the seeds of majoritarian formalism sprout
early in one's legal career.
This mode of thinking dovetails into a lawyer's professional
life. Stefancic and Delgado describe, with disfavor, the
professional lives of lawyers working in top law firms.7 6 They
point to high billable hour requirements, repetitive work, stress,
and inherent competition.7 7  Lawyers accept these realities
because the culture of law firm life dictates that they do.78 It is
here that Stefancic and Delgado succeed in showing the practical
application of formalism: the insular patterns that drive how
lawyers think also drive how they work. Moreover, formalism
dominates this context, as many lawyers live this way despite a
desire for something different.79
This pattern of formalism transfers into the personal lives of
many lawyers. Because the billable hour system has become the
norm for many lawyers at work, it drives their personal lives as
well. Stefancic and Delgado give this point primacy, placing it at
the beginning of their discussion of lawyers' personal lives.80
Consistent with a life driven by billable hours is constant stress
and pressure, factors that account for many of the negative trends
seen within the legal system: deterioration of physical and mental
health, substance abuse, a high divorce rate, depression, and even
suicide.81 Accordingly, Stefancic and Delgado ultimately attribute
these ill effects of legal practice to the forced and patterned
mindset of formalism.
It is counter to this overwhelming dominance of formalism
that the story of MacLeish offers hope. To be sure, Stefancic and
75. Id.
76. Id. at 62-71. The focus of Stefancic and Delgado's examination of
lawyers' lives is on those practicing in large law firms. They do, however,
offer a comparison with the lifestyle found in a small law firm, which they
conclude is scarcely different. See id. at 71.
77. See id. at 51-56.
78. Id. at 55.
79. See id. at 60-61 (describing how many lawyers frequently entertain
thoughts of leaving the profession).
80. See id. at 65.
81. See id. at 65-68.
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Delgado neither present MacLeish as a superhero nor his story as
a panacea. He struggled for decades in finding a remedy for his
incessant dissatisfaction with legal practice. But his story
represents a successful counterstory posited against the
majoritarian tale of formalism for two reasons: (1) MacLeish
refused to accept his unfulfilling life; and, (2) he ultimately found
a purposeful use for his legal skills in his work for Pound.
Therefore, by rejecting the presumed truth of formalism,
MacLeish showed that a life in the law need not be defined by its
constraints. This underscores Stefancic and Delgado's point that,
despite the pervasiveness of formalism, the individual lawyer may
reject it as a controlling mode of thought. It also furthers the
point that, if formalism can be challenged, change in the legal
profession is possible.
IV. FURTHER APPLICATIONS
Stefancic and Delgado's call for lawyers to challenge
formalism as their dominant pattern of thought serves a logical
antidote to the ills that plague the legal profession. But is their
argument overly conceptual? That is, while esoteric theory
permeates the law, legal practice is also a bottom-line business.
Law school graduates commonly face nearly insurmountable debt
and must make professional choices to maximize their earning
potential.8 2 Law firms exist as for-profit enterprises in a highly
competitive market; as such, they must act with sharp business
acumen to succeed. Thus, while How Lawyers Lose Their Way
presents a unique theoretical argument, would its resolution work
in the real world? Indeed, in applying Stefancic and Delgado's
conclusions to the economic realities of the legal industry, it is
evident that it would.
The concept of formalism extends to the economics of legal
practice. The billable hour approach is one example. In the
second half of the twentieth century, billing hours became the
most popular method for law firms to organize their businesses.8 3
82. For a detailed account of the debt many law school graduates face,
see Michael A. Olivas, Paying for a Law Degree: Trends in Student Borrowing
and the Ability to Repay Debt, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 333 (1999).
83. Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate
Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour
Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 246 (2000).
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The pervasiveness of that approach is self-perpetuating as billing
hours is only most effective when the highest numbers of hours
are billed. Accordingly, in the past few decades, billable hour
requirements of many firms have increased dramatically.8 4
Moreover, the billable hour requirement is no ancillary
consideration but rather constitutes a dominant characteristic of
legal practice for today's lawyers.8 5
Law school debts create a reality that causes many new
lawyers to feel compelled to accept the billable hours standard. In
the latter decade of the twentieth century, it has become common
for graduating law students to be saddled with huge educational
debt.86 Many students take high paying jobs in large law firms to
pay off their debt.87 Thus, the need to find the highest paying job
becomes the primary concern for many law school graduates,
providing another example of formalism in the economics of legal
practice.
These two examples of formalism obviously work in concert.
Pressure on graduates to pay off large law school debt provides
firms with a constant source of eager young lawyers. And because
firms maximize profits by increasing billable hours, they can offer
jobs with exceedingly high salaries.88 Thus, in the economic
formalism of legal practice, debt-ridden young lawyers take high-
paying jobs in large law firms and work tirelessly to meet high
billable hour requirements.
This arrangement has been cited as a cause of much of what
plagues the legal profession. Most notably, the drive to bill a
maximum number of hours has resulted in what commentators
call a "time famine."8 9 Because more hours can always be billed,
84. Morgan, supra note 6, at 43 (stating that a 1400-1500 billable hour
requirement was common thirty years ago but now such requirements
frequently exceed 2000).
85. Id. (referring to the billable hours approach as the "greatest source of
dissatisfaction among modern lawyers") (emphasis added).
86. Susan D. Carle, Re-valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 719, 738 n.67 (2001) ("[B]etween 1987 and 1997 alone, the
cost of law school tuitions more than doubled.... [Tihe median amount of
total loans for law students in the class of 1998 was almost $70,000 .... ).
87. Martin E. P. Seligman, Paul R. Verkuil & Terry H. Kang, Why
Lawyers are Unhappy, 23 CARDOzo L. REV. 33, 44 n.55 (2001) (stating that
young lawyers leave law firms "when their loans are [relpaid").
88. Fortney, supra note 83, at 248-49.
89. Id. at 263-67.
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many lawyers work with the constant belief that they must bill
more. As one young associate stated, "'No matter what I did, I felt
like I should be in the office doing work, not doing specific client
work, but racking up hours."'90 As a result, lawyers have less
personal time and are never satisfied with the work they have
completed. 91 This economic arrangement has also been cited as
responsible for a decrease in work quality and lapses in
professional ethics.92 Finally, high billable hour requirements for
young associates have been blamed for a high level of turnover, a
business cost many firms incur.93
But does it have to be this way? Are the circumstances of law
school graduates so predetermined that they must sell their
services to the highest bidder, no matter the personal or
professional costs? And is maximizing billable hours the only way
firms can operate as a business? Indeed, just as Stefancic and
Delgado argue that formalist thinking need not exist as
unqualified truth, such economic formalism need not be the
dominant arrangement for the legal industry either.
First, while law school debt is very real for many graduates,
at least one commentator has stated that the financial necessity of
taking a big firm job is more perception than reality.94 Moreover,
alternate, and often untapped, markets exist for graduates to
make a lucrative living. Susan Carle makes a compelling case for
law school graduates to consider careers that serve middle income
clients. 95 She notes that the market for lawyers representing such
clients is stable enough to afford a young lawyer a living.96 Yet it
is still underserved such that it also affords opportunity.97
90. Id. at 263.
91. Id. at 267.
92. Id. at 273, 278.
93. Id. at 283-84.
94. Id. at 287 (quoting a professor who states that, "'the number of
students whose economic circumstances compel them to take big firm jobs is
still substantially smaller then the number of students who claim that their
economic circumstances compel them to take big firm jobs'").
95. See generally Carle, supra note 86.
96. See id. at 722 (stating that the percentage of lawyers who earn their
living as solo practitioners or in small firms, which typically serve middle-
income clients, is 74 percent, up from 68 percent in 1980).
97. See id. at 723-24 (quoting a recent study finding that "nearly two
thirds of legal needs of moderate-income households were not taken into the
civil justice system in 1992").
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Furthermore, Carle argues that too few law school graduates
consider jobs in this sector when, in reality, many jobs are there to
be had.98 Thus, by allowing themselves to consider a wider array
of career options, young lawyers need not feel trapped by the
dominant economic arrangement the legal profession presents. 99
Additionally, law firms beholden to the billable hours
approach may also be forgoing opportunities for more effective
business practices. As noted, many blame strict adherence to
billable hour requirements for unhappy lawyers, substandard,
even unethical work, and high lawyer turnover. Currently, law
firm leaders give billable hours unquestioned primacy and choose
to spend less time on the personal and professional development of
their young associates. One commentator argues that treating
hours spent mentoring and training young associates with the
same importance as billable hours may improve work and
decrease attrition. 100 Stressing mentorship represents a deviation
from the dominant billable hours arrangement, but may be more
economically beneficial.
Others suggest that lawyers would be more fulfilled if firms
tailored work to a lawyer's strengths and interests. Firms could
make a concerted effort to identify their associates' strengths and
distribute assignments accordingly.' 0' Doing so would promote a
sense of ownership over the work, which, in turn, would increase
morale and stabilize the associate work force. Providing alternate
work schedules for lawyers with varied career objectives would
also personalize the law firm experience. Indeed, one study found
that many associates would be willing to exchange compensation
and advancement opportunities for having to work fewer hours.102
Providing such options, which also are contrary to the dominant
economic arrangement, may also prove beneficial to the legal
industry.
Therefore, the lessons Stefancic and Delgado offer regarding
the dominant mode of thought exhibited by many lawyers also
apply to the dominant economic arrangement of the industry.
98. See id. at 739.
99. For a discussion of the importance of client choice in a young lawyer's
career, see Morgan, supra note 6, at 52-54.
100. Fortney, supra note 83, at 293-94.
101. Seligman, Verkuil, & Kang, supra note 87, at 45.
102. Fortney, supra note 83, at 294.
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Specifically, Stefancic and Delgado identify formalism as the
majoritarian way that lawyers think, and illustrate how a well-
reasoned counterstory undermines its presumed truth. In doing
so, they persuade that formalism need not pervade lawyers'
thinking. Similarly, the economic arrangement in which law
firms seek to maximize billable hours and new lawyers seek jobs
similarly focused on this goal exists as the dominant economic
arrangement for legal practice. But, as demonstrated, the
dominance of this arrangement need not persist, especially when
it has been linked to so many negative effects on lawyers. Most
notable in this comparison, however, is that the same
argumentative approach Stefancic and Delgado employ to attack
formalist thought makes the same point when applied to the
economics of legal practice. Thus, while it appears that their
reliance on the narrative paradigm is a potential weakness
because of its narrow focus on formalist thought, such reliance is
indeed a strength when application of the narrative paradigm to
other contexts proves to be relevant as well.
V. CONCLUSION
In How Lawyers Lose Their Way: A Profession Fails its
Creative Minds, Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado address a
well-documented problem in a unique way. As they have
previously done in other contexts, they employ the narrative
paradigm to impeach the presumed truth of a majoritarian tale
with a well-reasoned counterstory. By clearly defining and
explaining formalism, they identify how, as a pattern of thought,
it exists as a majoritarian tale. Then, by presenting the unique
story of Ezra Pound and Archibald MacLeish, they offer a
counterstory that impeaches formalism's majoritarian control of
the life of a lawyer. In doing so, they show how formalism is at
the heart of what plagues the legal profession and how difficult it
is to challenge. But they also show that formalism need not exist
inevitably, thereby providing hope for a happier, more fulfilled
legal profession. Moreover, when applied not only to legal
thought, but also to legal economics, lessons of the narrative
paradigm prove similarly relevant in improving the legal
profession. This further application strengthens the point that,
while much plagues the legal profession, a brighter future is
indeed possible.
